Introduction
The reality is more complicated and lies in the peace and security dilemmas of the Horn. This essay explores three elements that lie behind the current crisis. One is the role of Ethiopia, and specifically its national security strategy. The current military incursion into Somalia is only one instance of Ethiopia’s strategy for dealing with immediate threats to its national security and regional stability, which uses a combination of diplomacy and force in pursuit of consistent goals. In the 1990’s, Ethiopia successfully neutralized serious security threats arising from radical Islamism and it is currently doing the same again. It would be lazy thinking and condescending to see Ethiopia as a pawn of U.S. policy, following a strategy dictated from elsewhere.
A second element is the Eritrean strategy, notably its continuing conflict with Ethiopia. Eritrea has also been extremely consistent in its analysis and action, seeing its national interest as best served by a weak, unstable or dismembered Ethiopia. A third theme is the role of Islam in the region, with a focus on the danger of allowing local conflicts to become submerged within a wider confrontation between the U.S. and global Islamic militants.
A fundamental point that recurs is one of political and ideological consistency. The Ethiopian government has acted consistently in pursuit of what it identifies as its national interest and in accordance with its political analyses of the region. Political Islam has sometimes been a rogue element but has more often been ready to accommodate the structures of state and civic power, peacefully pursuing modest goals within those frameworks. The great danger that faces the Horn today is that problems, which are essentially local and manageable, are allowed to spiral out of control, leading to an escalation in violence, confrontation and polarization. It is our collective responsibility to prevent this from happening, and the first step is a sober and rigorous analysis of the current situation.
Ethiopia and its National Security Dilemmas
Historically, Ethiopia has been the hub of either stability or instability
in north-east Africa. Although poor, Ethiopia has a long history of statecraft
and a sense of national identity and a military tradition, which together mean
that it is capable of acting in pursuit of a clearly-conceived national
interest. Ethiopia can project force beyond its own borders, and also act with
sufficient restraint to prevent its use of military power from turning into a
destabilizing adventurism. During the periods in which Ethiopia has been strong
and respected (the last years of Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule, approximately
1960-68, and the period after the fall of the Derg 1991-97), the country has
been able to contain the forces of instability in the region. When Ethiopia has
itself been conflicted, or has been seen as weak, political problems in the
Horn have remained unmanaged, and have often run out of control.
Since the Second World War, Ethiopian foreign policy has been primarily focused
on maintaining the nation’s independence and territorial integrity. Throughout
abrupt changes of regime and the reversals of political ideology, successive
governments have pursued foreign policies of remarkable consistency. Ethiopian
governments have often supported rebel groups fighting against governments in
Somalia and Sudan, but in all cases this has occurred in response to similar
actions by that neighbor against Ethiopia, and in all instances the Ethiopian
government has been keen to ensure that the insurgent group concerned is
unified and disciplined, with a clear political agenda. The single major change
has been the recognition of Eritrea as an independent state. But the readiness
to fight a costly war over the disputed boundary with Eritrea in 1998-2000
indicates that the new northern border of Ethiopia is regarded with just as
much seriousness as previous borders.
Many of the key questions concerning Ethiopia’s national security interest were
raised in an Ethiopian government White Paper in 2002.1 Building on this
official analysis, we can identify three concentric rings of Ethiopian national
security concern. The outermost ring is the strategic challenge, posed by Egypt
and a possible future militant Islamist state in the Arabian peninsular. In the
middle ring are the neighboring countries that can pose an immediate security
threat through invasion or destabilization, the latter through sponsoring rural
guerrillas or urban terrorists. In the innermost ring are those local issues in
sensitive border areas that can provide a spark for conflict, which may then
escalate out of control. One may agree or disagree with the analysis and the
conclusions of this White Paper. But it is notable that the Ethiopian state is
capable of articulating and pursuing a coherent security strategy and foreign
policy.
Historically, Ethiopia’s principal rival for control over the Horn has been
Egypt. For Egypt, the Nile is a matter of life and death, and Egyptians have
been fearful that those who control the Nile headwaters can hold the country
ransom. Egypt’s concern over the Nile has increased in recent years, because
the country has been taking more water than it is allocated according to the
1955 Nile Waters Agreement—an agreement that was based on estimates of river
flow from an era of high rainfall, which may now be coming to an end on account
of climate change—and because peace in Sudan and the prospects of economic
development in Ethiopia imply that upstream states will be utilizing more water
from the river. The Nile Waters Agreement was signed by most of the countries
of the Nile Basin, but not by Ethiopia. About 80% of the flow of the Nile
originates from the Blue Nile, which has its source in Ethiopia, and other
tributaries in the Ethiopian highlands. Currently, Ethiopia utilizes only a
fraction of its potential for irrigation and hydroelectric power. If Ethiopia
were to exploit this resource—which may soon become an issue of national
survival in Ethiopia, given its chronic vulnerability to drought and
famine—Egypt will become gravely concerned. In its quest for a secure flow of
water, Egypt has historically sought to dominate Sudan and encircle
Ethiopia.
Under the auspices of the World Bank, the Nile Basin Initiative has taken
important steps towards harmonizing the interests of all the riparian states in
a common water use strategy. This is an important step forward that begins to
move Egypt from seeing the Nile Waters as a zero-sum game. The two countries,
both status quo powers, have many common interests that could best be served by
partnership.
Ethiopia also harbors a strategic concern over radical Islamism in Egypt and
the Arabian peninsula. Ethiopia’s population is equally divided between
Christians and Muslims and the country contains the city of Harer, which is one
of Islam’s holiest sites. For the last four hundred years, with only brief
interludes, Ethiopia’s history has been marked by mutual respect and tolerance
among faiths. The attitude of successive governments has been to nurture this
accommodation and resist the politicization of religion. However, Ethiopia has
needed to keep a watchful eye on the activity of foreign militants in the Horn,
who regularly introduce destabilizing agendas. An attempt by radical Islamists
to create Islamic states in north-east Africa, fully backed by the power and
wealth of the Gulf states, would be a profound threat to Ethiopia. However, the
activities of those militants actually present in the Horn—located in Sudan in
the 1990's and in Somalia recently—remain a smaller-scale threat. This set of
issues will be explored more in the third section of this essay.
