The Political Roots of the Current Crisis in Region 5
Published on: Sep 21, 2007
In retrospect, Ethiopian-Somalis’ continuous alienation from the national polity appears blatant. EPRDF’s inability to make Somalis feel at home within a decentralized Ethiopian political system was not the outcome that the ruling party had wished for. Quite the opposite is the case. After taking power EPRDF sought to accelerate development in the country’s heavily marginalized lowland areas belonging to the Somali, Afar, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states. Despite their limited financial absorption capacity, federal budget transfers to the so-called ‘backward regions’ steadily increased over the past decade. The granting of self-government and investments in human capacity-building for the first time in modern Ethiopian history enabled the emergence of an educated elite within the periphery.  

Region 5 forcefully demonstrates that national identity cannot be decreed or engineered by financial subsidies, political quotas or the holding of elections. 14 Strategies to win people’s hearts and minds operate at the symbolic as much as at the political level. ‘Why are there no Somali flight attendants working for Ethiopian airlines?’ an intellectual from the region once asked in a private conversation.15 More than any all-embracing analysis, this question grasps a key problem; the persistent gap between EPRDF-propagated self-determination for the country’s ‘nations and nationalities’ and Somalis’ de facto exclusion from national institutions.

Absence of meaningful organized interest groups

    
Another conflict aggravating factor is the near absence of political groups and civil society organizations in region 5 who are able to garner popular support beyond their immediate constituency. Organized interest groups seldom reach out to the grassroots level and tend to pursue narrow agendas in the name of ‘clan’, ‘security’ or ‘humanitarian aid’. Their ability to contribute to problem-solving in the highly politicized context of the region is limited. A brief and inevitably superficial overview of the region’s most important actors confirms this observation.

Regional politicians and officials of the ruling SPDP are discredited in the eyes of the population, which views them as corrupt clients who are accountable to federal officials only. The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and other federal representatives present in the region such as customs and security officials or party cadres are feared for their arbitrariness, harshness and dogmatic policies, which often clash with regional realities.16 Fearing repression or sanctions, regional politicians and international organizations have rarely dared to confront federal officials publicly.

ONLF draws on support from the Ogaadeen, but has been unable to overcome its parochial clan basis. Politically, the rebels have been wavering between secession and irredentism with parts of neighboring Somalia while their Diaspora based leadership is internally divided.17 Islamic militants of the United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), a small successor group of al-Ittihad al-Islaami, operate beyond the customary authority of clans and do not share ONLF’s secular nationalism. Jihadists belonging to al-shabaab, the radical youth wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), follow a global salafist agenda that brings them into opposition with the region’s traditionally moderate Sunni believers.   

In the realm of customary clan authority, the picture is only slightly better. While some clan elders have managed to maintain a standing within their community, many have been co-opted by the SPDP, the national military or the ONLF. The multiplication of titled elders who compete over the leadership of identical clan segments is an indicator of the politicization and weakened power of customary chiefs.

In the last years a number of local non-governmental aid organizations (NGOs) have sprung up in region 5. With few exceptions their beneficiaries and outreach are defined genealogically. Several NGOs more resemble private companies than charitable organizations, often serving as a vehicle to promote the careers of their founders within regional politics.

International aid organizations are eyed suspiciously by the federal government and their regional counterpart is disorganized. Implementation is challenged by the volatile security environment and dilapidated infrastructure and, in the case of UN agencies, by overly bureaucratic internal regulations. Consequently, few international organizations have managed to maintain a continuous presence in the field and to move from short-term humanitarian interventions to longer term development work. 18

This admittedly bleak assessment of political and development actors in region 5 is reinforced by the absence of a public space in which ideas and information can circulate freely. Region 5 is one of the few Somali inhabited territories without independent newspapers, radios or television programs. Existing media outlets such as BBC’s Somali service, the government’s Somali programme on Radio FANA, ONLF’s radio Xoriyo or different Diaspora websites either report from outside the region or broadcast highly partisan views. As the region’s pressing political and development problems are not relayed by the media, informed public debates that could result in constructive political change rarely take place. Consequently, political discourse is dominated by military actors and security considerations.

Long-standing ignorance by the international community


The ‘Ogaden problem’ is not new. Political violence involving Ethiopian soldiers, regional security forces, ONLF rebels and clan militias has a long history in region 5. Recurrent humanitarian crises triggered by droughts, floods, conflict and population displacement have haunted the Ethiopian-Somali lowlands for several decades. Until ONLF’s attack on the Chinese oil field in Degehabur in April 2007, international organizations, Western diplomats and aid agencies have by and large chosen to ignore everyday occurrences in region 5. Political developments were not monitored, elections not observed and human rights violations not made public. ‘The harsh environment’, ‘Somalis are always fighting’, ‘pastoralists do what they want’ – these are but some of the explanations that international community representatives have offered to excuse their chronic indifference towards the region. Both multilateral organizations and foreign donors would have been well advised to strengthen their presence in region 5, to connect with the local population, and to engage regional and federal authorities in a dialogue on the numerous unresolved political and development issues. Instead major Western powers including the United States tacitly support Ethiopia’s counter-insurgency methods in region 5 as part of their joint anti-terrorism agenda in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusions

The current crisis in region 5 is not the logical outcome of the 1977/78 Ogaden war. Several opportunities for more peaceful and prosperous development have arisen since the creation of Ethiopia’s Somali region in 1991, and different actors bear responsibility for not seizing them. ONLF missed the chance of establishing a more inclusive administration before 1994 and, later on, of winning followers among the region’s different clans groups. The federal government’s brutal anti-insurgency tactics reduce the scope for political dialogue between the conflict parties and instead turn large parts of the Ogaadeen population into ONLF supporters. The international community could have declared resolving the decade-old conflict between ONLF and the Ethiopian government a priority a long time ago. It missed a major window of opportunity when it ignored the Ogaadeen elders’ mediation initiative between the federal government and ONLF after the 2005 elections.
 
For a long time a buffer zone between Ethiopia and Somalia, region 5 has transformed into a hotspot where Ethiopian and Somali, global and local forces are clashing with one another. The recent escalation of the ONLF insurgency and targeted killings and bombings in the region are indicators of this trend. Another and equally worrying indicator is the fact that the two sides, ONLF and the Ethiopian government, have run short of political visions. On the one side, the Ogaadeen rebels have set their mind on ‘decolonizing’ region 5 militarily, but have no proposals on offer regarding what future political, economic and administrative solutions for the region might look like. On the other side, the federal government has lost impetus in attending to the region’s development and humanitarian problems, choosing instead to make ‘security’ and ‘anti-terrorism’ the overriding policy agenda. No attempt is made by either side to genuinely address the political roots of the current crisis.

From an outsider’s viewpoint, new political visions are therefore urgently needed to remedy the current stalemate in region 5. To be met with success, such visions have to transcend the Somalis versus Ethiopians stereotype, draw on popular support and not elite interests, and take into account the Somali territories’ wider political economy as well as Ethiopia’s national security concerns. Ultimately, concrete solutions to improve the well-being of the region’s inhabitants seem far more important than the question of which national flag should fly over Jijiga.


Zürich, 21 September 2007

Endnotes

1 To distinguish Ogaden as a geographical area from the clan, I use the Somali spelling ‘Ogaadeen’ to refer to the latter. The Ogaadeen heartland roughly consists of Degehabur, Fiq, Godey, Kabridehar and Godey zones.

2 Ogaden National Liberation Front, ‘O.N.L.F. Statement on War Crimes in Ogaden’, 23 July 2007, available from <http://www.onlf.org/onlf_july232007.html> (accessed 19 September 2007).

3 An overview of the region’s recent history is provided by Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, ‘State and Politics in Ethiopia's Somali Region since 1991’, Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies, Issue 6, 2006.

4 See Roland Marchal’s contribution to this web-forum.

5 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘In Ethiopian Desert, Fears and Cries of Army Brutality’, New York Times, 18 June 2007.

6 Cedric Barnes, ‘The Ethiopian State and its Somali Periphery, circa 1888-1948’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2000.

7 Tobias Hagmann, ‘Beyond Clannishness and Colonialism: Understanding Political Disorder in Ethiopia's Somali Region, 1991-2004’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2005.

8 Amharic for rifleman.

9 The following paradox is observable. Although improvements in social services delivery and building of infrastructure under EPRDF have surpassed those of previous regimes, people’s demands for more development and democracy are unabated. Lahra Smith, Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2007.

10 Tobias Hagmann, ‘Challenges of Decentralisation in Ethiopia's Somali region’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 104-105, 2005.

11 The kebele (peasant or pastoralist association) is the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia.

12 John Markakis, ‘The Somali in the New Political Order of Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 21, No. 59, 1994.

13 Abdi Ismail Samatar, ‘Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 6, 2004.

14 A quite different example is Kenya whose Somali inhabited Northern Frontier District (NFD) has increasingly been made part of the national body politic in recent years following several decades of marginalization and an almost permanent state of emergency.

15 Author’s interview.

16 A case in point is federal trade policy and government attempts to eliminate cross-border contraband.

17 An ongoing power struggle pits ONLF chairman Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman and his followers against a group led by the rebels’ head of Planning and Research Department, Dr. Mohamed Sirad Dalool. Abdi M. Abdulahi, ‘Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): The Dilemma of its Struggle in Ethiopia’, Review of African Political Economy, forthcoming 2007.

18 A notable exception is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) who had a long standing presence in region 5. ICRC was forced to shut down its operations in end of July 2007 after the Ethiopian government accused it of collaborating with ONLF.