The first months of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ‘residence’ in Mogadishu has seen a severe deterioration in security in Mogadishu. By all accounts the TFG and its Ethiopian allies are generally restricted to key strategic points in the city. Much of the sprawling suburbs of west and northwest Mogadishu—Hodan, Hawlwadaag, Wardhigley, Yaqshid, Huruwa that also happen to be Hawiye strongholds—are no-go areas for TFG and Ethiopian troops. These are the areas where ‘insurgent’ attacks are launched, to which the TFG/Ethiopian forces usually respond with heavy artillery. Significant numbers of civilians have left Mogadishu, and most of the casualties are civilians.1 The TFG has said that it is dealing with an ‘insurgency’.2 However, it would not be an exaggeration to characterize Mogadishu as facing an imminent civil war of sorts.
It is generally assumed that resurgent Islamists are behind the insurgency, and the TFG has encouraged this view. Indeed, it is rumored that key individuals from the Islamic courts have returned to the capital, including the Sheikh Adan Ayrow, Sheikh Muktar Robbow ‘Abu Mansour’, and Sheikh Indha’adde. However there is also a suspicion that disgruntled warlords—no allies of the Islamic courts—may be behind some of the attacks.3
The Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jelle recently accused Sheikh Abdilkadir Ali Omar, religious leader of the Habr Gedir, Saleban sub-clan (and deputy to the Chair of the Islamic courts executive council Sheikh Sharif), of leading the insurgency.4 However the TFG’s attempts to divide and rule are contributing to an air of mutual distrust. Clan ‘vigilante’ groups have been established in the capital to protect neighborhoods.5A series of assassinations of policemen, middle ranking officials and high profile individuals including the Prime Minister’s brother-in-law, while directed at TFG ‘collaborators’, will also be interpreted through a clan lens.6
Though Islamist-inspired resistance is certainly part of the equation, there is now a real threat of Mogadishu descending into clan-based violence on a scale not seen since 1991-1993. Tension in the capital is running high with the TFG bringing thousands of newly-trained militias (mostly Majerteen and Rahanweyn) into the capital. Ethiopian troops who vacated their positions in the southern city of Kismayo are still camped just outside the city, and the Ugandan vanguard of the AU peacekeeping forces has clearly identified with the TFG. The indications are that the government intends to disarm the Hawiye militias by force, an act that will finally force the ‘clans’ to show their hand. There are reports that Habr Gedir militias are reconditioning their ‘technicals’ to be ready for urban warfare; other non-Hawiye warlords are also suspected of rearming.7
The clan factor in Somali politics
It is true that clan analysis of Somali politics neglects other important dynamics in the Somali crisis;8 nevertheless clan political discourse still animates the politics of Somalia. Clan rivalry—even if it is a result of a false consciousness—is part of ‘tradition’ in Somalia, particularly oral tradition. The discourse of clan is well-preserved in oral poetry and genealogical memory, and is readily activated when need be. As one recent author has put it, clans or genealogical descent groups, are ‘not only good to fight with (or play politics or do business with), but good to think with’.9
Whether ‘clan’—like ‘tribe’ in Africa—is an invented tradition in Somalia is still a moot point.10 Certainly clan politics strengthened with the arrival of the colonial powers. Moreover, when the nationalist Somali politicians took over power from the colonial masters, clan politics were given full vent. Somalia’s early post-independence administration was marked not only by a period of competitive democracy but also by pervasive corruption and nepotism based on clans. Cleaning the Augean stables of Somali clannish politics became the public preoccupation of Siyad Barre’s military ‘revolutionary’ regime that overthrew the civilian administration in October 1969.
However, it is also widely recognized that in spite of his public pronouncements against ‘clan’, Siyad Barre also manipulated clan politics through his famous ‘MOD’ alliance in the Darod triumvirate of Marehan, Ogaden and Dolbahante. Moreover, the main clan protagonists that ousted Siyad Barre were also clearly identified by their Hawiye, Isaq and Ogaden (Darod) clan bases. In August 1990, their political leaders reached an agreement to form the next government, but none of the three rebel leaders—namely General Mohamed Farah Aideed (the Hawiye), Abdurahman Ali Tuur (the Isaq), and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jees (the Ogaden)—was able to prevent the reification of national Somali politics along clan lines.
The dominant Isaq clan interests in the SNM pushed through Somaliland’s secession from the rest of the country, which occured in May 1991. The Ogaden factional leadership, overwhelmed by the new hostility between the Hawiye and Darod were forced to fight alongside their Darod kinsmen. The Hawiye rushed to stake their claim on Mogadishu. Further divisions fractured the Hawiye, as warlord-entrepreneurs activated the full range of lineage loyalties to pursue their own personal ambitions in Mogadishu and throughout south-central Somalia.
Since then, whenever there has been an attempt—either from Somalis or from an outside hand—to reconcile the rival sides, it has foundered on the inherent dynamism of the Somali clan system that provides alternative leaderships and oppositional factions. For example the TNG partially failed after some warlords with the backing of their clans opposed its legitimacy; yet another case of an infinite number of alternatives to one set of clan alliances. The clan alliances underpinning the TNG were opposed and replaced by a rival set of alliances—aided and abetted by Ethiopia—that became the TFG.
The TFG through a clan lens
Though the TFG claims to be a national government, its founding charter explicitly recognizes the clan factor in Somali politics, and thus must strive for the ever elusive, perfect ‘clan-balance’. The TFG institutions are based on the so-called ‘4.5 formula’, designed to balance and share representation and power in Somalia between the four main clan families (Dir, Darod, Hawiye and Rahanweyn), as well as five minority constituencies. The 4.5 formula originally emerged from a previous reconciliation conference held in Djibouti in 2000 which resulted in the creation of the ineffectual Transitional National Government (TNG) that lasted from 2000-2004.
At first glance, the TFG’s composition reflects the 4.5 clan ‘formula’. The President of the TFG, Colonel Abudullahi Yusuf, is a Majerteen from the (Harti) Darod clan family that dominates the Northeastern semi-autonomous Puntland region. The Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, is a Hawiye, from the Abgal branch that claims to be the one of autochthonous clans of Mogadishu. The third important figure in the TFG is the Speaker of the TFG Parliament, currently Sheikh Aden Muhammad Nur ‘Madobe’. The present and previous speakers are from the Rahanweyn (Digil and Mirifle), a large confederation of mixed ‘agro-pastoral’ clans, that inhabit the inter-riverine regions of southern Somalia and speak a distinct dialect (Af Maay-Maay).
Superficially, it seems that the constituent parts of the TFG reflect the ‘4.5 formula’ of clan balance and inclusiveness. However the popular perception in southern Somalia—at least among some of the Hawiye opinion formers—is that the TFG is an ‘alien’ Darod institution. Indeed, there is some evidence that beyond the ministerial appointees, Abdullahi Yusuf is gathering a Darod dominated security apparatus that will become the real backbone of the administration (rather like his predecessor Siyad Barre). Some sources have gone to great lengths to detail the Majerteen (Darod) dominance of the ‘inner circle’ of the Presidential staff and key military and security positions.11
Moreover, it is also argued that the high-profile Hawiye appointments in the TFG are not particularly supported by the clans they are supposed to represent. Though the Prime Minister’s role is partly as the ‘Hawiye’ representative at the heart of government, it is argued that he does not represent the real representatives of Hawiye political and economic power in southern Somalia, the Habr Gedir clans. Indeed, even his own Abgal-Warsengeli sub-clan constituencies are not perceived to support the Prime Minister. Some wealthy and powerful Warsengeli individuals were key supporters of the Islamic Courts.
Furthermore, internal Warsengeli politics have some bearing on the ‘insurgent’ mortar attacks against Mogadishu port and the recent assassination attempt on the ports director, Abdii Jinnow (also from the Warsengeli, Abgal branch of the Hawiye). Though the port is a key strategic foothold for the TFG and thus a target for insurgents, another explanation may be that rival Warsengeli interests that previously controlled the alternative port at El-Ma’an want to disrupt the main port’s operations.
Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi had also angered the wider Hawiye business class by his removal of (the previous) Speaker of the TFG parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. Though Rahaweyn, Sharif Hassan was seen to be the key representative of the Hawiye business class in the TFG, and a constant thorn in the side of the executive, especially the Prime Minister. Sharif Hassan’s politicking, first with dissident TFG (Hawiye) ministers and later with the Islamic courts, led to his removal after the Ethiopian-backed TFG ‘victory’ over the Islamic courts. This was perceived as a significant tipping of the clan-balance of the TFG away from the Hawiye.